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“Iz poslushaniia Ego Velichestva ne
vykhodim, a ostat’sia nesoglasny”
The perceptions of law, justice and a “just authority” in the petitions of
Russian peasants in the second half of the eighteenth century
« Nous ne désobéirons pas à Sa Majesté, mais nous refusons de rester » : les
perceptions du droit, de la justice et d’une « juste autorité » dans les pétitions de
paysans russes de la seconde moitié du XVIIIe siècle
Aljona Brewer
1 A  study  about  the  perceptions  and  ideas  of  justice  and  of  a  “just  authority”  in
18th century Russia cannot avoid paying attention to the numerous petitions which have
been submitted by the various people from all parts of Russian society at the courts and
offices of the local authorities and the higher instances of government – up to the tsar
himself – when they were seeking justice. For the large majority of the Russian populace
of the 18th century, the petition was the only medium by which they could complain
about  their  woes  and  the  injustice  that  they  suffered  and  by  which  they  could
communicate  with the  authorities.  For  later  historians,  it  is  largely  the  sole  written
evidence which remains of  the mostly illiterate people of  the 18th century.  Both the
content of the petitions – that is, the denotation of what was perceived as unjust and
what was felt to be good and just – and the manner of their communication with the
authorities  provide an interesting insight  into the petitioners’  perceptions  of  a  “just
authority”. Before I explain the subject, the actors and the sources of my study, I will
briefly outline the theoretical background of my considerations, the concept of justice
that I use and my attempt to operationalize this concept.
 
Justice as conflict
2 My methodical approach is not simply that of a conceptual history – I do not merely
concentrate on the use of the word spravedlivost’ or pravda1 in the petitions.
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3 Instead,  I  have  tried  to  determine  the  petitioners’  concept  of  justice  in  its  wider
semantical  context  and determine how it  defined their  behavior  toward –  and their
communication with – the authorities. I do not understand the concept of justice here
simply as the accordance to a positivistic law but rather as an ideal which is based on
some specific moral values and norms and which is not articulated until people are aware
of  its  absence.  This  means  that  perceptions  of  justice  manifest  themselves  where
historical actors perceive injustice and protest against it. “Justice is conflict” – not only
because  ideas  of  justice  do  not  become  visible  until  the  shift  following  a  historical
conflict,2 but also because it is ideas of justice which may be the main reason in producing
conflicts.  Edward Thompson, writing about the opposition of the English lower social
classes in the 18th century said that it  has not always been imminent misery which
initiated protest. What gave the people a reason to act was instead the violation of certain
“moral  assumptions”3 which can also be understood as the feeling of  what is  just  or
unjust. Moreover, and finally, it is this conclusion that “justice is conflict”4 which invokes
the idea that a study of justice must also be the study of the processes of communication
and negotiation (of what is  just or unjust).  From this point of view, the focus of my
interest looks not only to justice as it was implemented in official institutions and the
political theories and ideas underlying them, but also on justice as the manifold practices
and procedures of historical actors in realizing justice in their particular context.5
4 It was based on these considerations that I chose the subject and the sources for my
study. The conflicts involving justice that I have turned my attention to are the riots of
the factory peasants which spread across Russia during the middle of the 18th century. As
I am not concerned with the social history of these conflicts or merely a history of events,
I refer only to certain basic information here.6 Since the efforts of Peter the Great to raise
the  country’s  “general  welfare,”  the  Russian  textile,  metal  and  mining  industries
experienced  constant  growth.  To  provide  for  the  growing  number  of  factories  with
workers, the state allowed factory owners to employ not only hired free men or their own
serfs, but also state peasants, who were compelled to serve their head tax by working on
the enterprises. Between 1719 and 1762, the number of those “assigned peasants” had
risen more than four times7 and, since 1721,  state peasants worked not only in state
enterprises but could also be assigned to private factories.8 Most of them perceived this as
their unlawful transfer into serfdom. Moreover, this new kind of work not only entailed a
greater physical and material burden for the peasants (for example, because of the vast
distances between residences and factories, the deplorable working conditions and bad
supplies). Factory work was also a grave intrusion into the traditional rural way of life. It
tore the peasants from their families and communes, as well as out of the seasonally-fixed
rhythm of rural work. This was why, from the beginning of its existence, there had been
protests against compulsory factory work.9 However, it was not until the period between
the  mid-1750s  and  the  mid-1760s  that  the  various  turmoils  had  become  a  mass
disturbance in the Ural  region,  where the Russian mining and metal  industries were
concentrated. Although those riots never reached the dimensions of the later Pugachëv
uprising in terms of the magnitude of their organization, their spatial expansion or their
ideological  radicalism,  they  are  nonetheless  an  interesting  subject  for  analyzing  the
concepts and perceptions of justice in the sense outlined above.
5 First of all, the motive of those conflicts was – not least of all – the legitimacy of authority
and the question of an equitable balance of power. The protests were not only about
working conditions but also about to whom the peasants owed obedience and where they
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saw  the  limits  of  the  authorities’  powers.  The  second,  and  most interesting,  point
concerns the practices of the protests’ participants in establishing justice. This seems to
be inconsistent at first because, on the one hand, they offered open and violent resistance
even  against  state  authority  – that  is,  the  military  commandos  sent  by  the  local
administration to restrain the riots. At the same time, in the most often studied cases, the
peasants  affirmed  their  loyalty  to  the  monarch  and  the  law  by  using  the  official
institutions  of  justice  and  submitting  collective  petitions  (chelobitnye)  to  the  local
administration, the Senate or any other body in charge. Furthermore, since the spring of
1762,  factory  peasants  could  also  submit  their  petitions  to  a  special  commission  of
investigation. In December 1762, the new Empress Catherine the Great herself entrusted
Count Aleksandr Alekseevich Viazemskii with the direction of this commission and sent
him to those areas most affected by the riots. His task was not merely to suppress the
riots with military assistance but also to investigate the causes and circumstances of the
unrest,  for which purpose the commission should accept petitions brought in by the
peasants from the local factories.
6 The third point which has made a study on the fabric peasants’ riots attractive for my
purposes notes the number of available sources which constitute the basis for my study.
These are, primarily, the findings of the official commission for the investigation of the
peasants’ riots which can be found in several volumes in the Senate fonds of the RGADA in
Moscow.10 Many of the petitions found there had also been published in several soviet
monographs and source collections.11 Additionally, I have studied other cases from the
fonds of the Senate in the RGADA which succeed the Ural uprisings chronologically but
which display a clear continuity with the latter and,  hence,  can help in significantly
rounding off the image of the Russian peasants’ ideas of justice in the second half of the
18th century.12 Based on the theoretical thoughts on the concept of justice presented
above, I have tried to find out how Russian factory peasants did communicate with the
authorities during their conflict for justice, which practices they used to establish justice
and which ideas of a just authority underlay their actions. Thus, some central questions
are: Which image of a good and just authority did the peasants outline in their petitions
and in what way could some limits to the authorities’ powers be identified here? From
which sources  did  the  peasants  draw their  conceptions  of  justice  and what  was  the
relation between justice and law? How were the authorities – and especially the monarch
– perceived in their functions as institutions of justice? Which role was attributed to the
different  authorities  and  instances  of  governance  during  the  process  of  establishing
justice? And finally, what was the peasants’ self-perception within that process and in
their relationship with the authorities?
7 What I want to avoid is a conception of the peasants’ ideas and their perceptions of law,
justice and authority as being irrational or as crude and inferior in comparison with the
“enlightened,” rationalized and Europeanized understanding of law and the state of the
Russian ruling elites and the liberal intelligentsia of the 19th century. The latter has been
tried  in  the  Russian  historiography  by  implementing  the  concept  of  a  “naïve
monarchism” that should avoid such a pejorative assessment of peasant ideas.13 However,
this  approach  also  remained  problematic  because  it  continued  to  accentuate  the
irrational element of the peasants’ ideas and, in the end, could not avoid the implicit
attribution of the peasants’ “backwardness”.14 However, new approaches to the study of
the peasants’ culture of justice and their relation to state authorities and institutions
show that the actions of the peasants and the underlying ideas of justice, first of all, in no
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way lack their own specific logic and rationality and, secondly, rebut the belief in the
passivity of the unprivileged Russian subjects toward authority.15 In my work with the
petitions of factory peasants, I have tried to unfold this particular logic of the peasants’
perceptions of justice and their practices in establishing it.
 
Chelobitnye, donosheniia, prosheniia
8 The  basis  for  my study  comprises  those  documents  about  the  unrest  of  the  factory
peasants in the second half of the 18th century found in the fonds of the Senate and its
Secret  Chancellery.  Among  them  are  around  65  collective  petitions  from  peasant
communities.  Most  of  them were addressed to  one of  the  investigation commissions
established in order to quiet down the uprisings.16 Of course, most such petitions were
not written by the peasants themselves. Instead, they had engaged an official clerk – a
priest, soldier, academy student or any other “gramotnyi” – for doing this, as becomes
clear from the signatures set at the end of each petition. However, I do not believe that
this  reduces  the  significance  of  the  petitions  as  authentic  evidence  of  the  peasants’
demands and ideas – the influence of  the non-peasant writers on the content of  the
petitions does not seem to be essential. Indeed, not all of the peasants were illiterate and I
found evidence that there were many peasants among the writers of the petitions or at
least hints that many of the petitions had been signed by the peasants’ own hands. For
example, in the material published by Orlov, at least six petitions out of 29 had been
written by a peasant and sixteen of them had been signed by peasants who represented
their communities.17 Besides, it can be assumed that the writer indicated in a petition was
not always the same person as the actual author of the petition. In the first instance, he
was merely a person who had copied a text he had received as a first draft (chernovik)
neatly and onto a sheet of official paper, while the actual author of the petition could
have  been  a  different  person.  Not  infrequently,  this  was  even  one  of  the  peasants
themselves,  as  becomes  clear  from  some  of  the  interrogations  in  the  investigation
commission.18 Other  documents  of  the  commission  also  reveal  that  the  peasant
community was intensely involved in the planning of the composition and submission
petitions.  The content of  the petitions was always discussed by the peasants in their
commune assemblies (mir) in advance.19
9 Furthermore, the question of authorship is not so relevant when the submission of a
petition is seen as an active undertaking on the part of the petitioners and as a means of
communication with the authorities,20 whose use provides information about the way in
which the authorities were perceived and how justice was viewed by the historical actors.
10 At the same time, in their search for justice, the petitioners were acting within the limits
given to them institutionally – or at least, they made efforts to do so. This is why there
was not – of  course – any open criticism of  the government in the petitions or any
utopian descriptions of justice that could have conflicted with the government. That does
not mean that such utopias were not a constant part of the peasants’ ideas, as at the very
least  it  shows  the  great  extent  of  peasant  involvement  in  the  Pugachëv  uprising.21
Equally, it also does not contradict other peasants’ practices for establishing justice –
namely, the violence and open resistance against the representatives of government.
11 Instead, it fits readily into the concept of a specific form of peasant pragmatism within
their relation to the authorities. When the petitioners wanted to be successful with their
submission, they had to comply with the rules and use the language predetermined by
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the authorities. As petitioners, they could not allude to the utopian notion of justice of an
absolute freedom from any authorities; rather, they had to try to use the possibilities
available to them within the ruling order and so claim them for their advantage. Thus,
they did not demand absolute justice but rather a status which, compared to their present
situation, would simply be more just. Generally, the peasants sought to be released from
serfdom or  from their  factory  assignments  and so  become state  peasants  or  else  be
transferred from a private factory to a state factory.22 Alternatively, they compared their
dreadful situation with the living and working conditions under a former owner or with
the situation in some other, nearby factory. This is why the simple act of submitting a
petition was, first of all, an affirmation of authority. However, it is a rather simplified
view of the peasant’s concept of justice and authority.23 This is because, first of all, the
peasants frequently used the official institutions of justice in a way in which they thought
would be correct rather than according to the actual meaning of the law. Second, by
submitting a petition, the peasants affirmed only that authority which they had already
accepted anyway. When faced with an unjust authority which they did not trust,  the
peasants would not submit a petition but rather they would disobey it and send their
petition to the next higher instance of justice. The ruling authority was accepted, but
only as long as it fulfilled its functions as a good authority. The Russian peasants had
quite a clear own vision of  what that was just  grounded on historically far reaching
traditions.
 
The criteria of a just authority
12 In a petition to the Senate from December 1761, peasants from the Avziano-Petrovsk
ironwork in the Kazan’ guberniia complained urgently about one of their bailiffs, whom
they characterized as follows:
And the mentioned murderer Kolaleev – a man without the least mercy and reason,
who has forgotten the fear of God and disdained the public laws, also called those
poor, ruined people, who were sent off together with their families, disobedients.24
13 Such a characterization is typical as a representation of an unjust authority as arises in
the studied documents. What find exemplary expression here are the main criteria of a
just authority and the sources of the petitioners’ idea of justice: 1) Justice as a personal
moral  virtue of  those who have authority –  the origins  of  this  personal  virtue were
human empathy, mercy and reason; 2) Justice as a religious, Christian virtue and as an
obligation to one’s own Christian conscience; 3) Finally, justice as the observance of the
laws and as an obligation to the monarch. In all of the petitions analyzed, these criteria
underlay the peasants’ description of what was unjust and the claim of a just authority in
one or another way. These criteria should help in classifying the following observations
and  outlining  a  conception  of  the  peasants’  perceptions  of  justice  which  combines
seemingly contradictory elements (i.e., because it was based on morality and religion, on
the one hand, and on the official law on the other hand). As such, it will be shown that
such a polarization between a seemingly irrational perception of justice and a rational
institutional law is not tenable. It will be illustrated that, on the one hand, the law played
an essential part in the peasants’ concepts and practices of justice while, on the other
hand, even those elements of their ideas and practices which can be characterized as
traditional, irrational or “naïve” by no means represent a merely passive “devotion” to
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the authorities. Rather, they reveal a specific inner logic and rationality as to the Russian
peasants’ perceptions and practices of justice.
 
The “irrationality” of peasants’ perceptions: personal
justice and justice as morality
14 Characteristic for the peasants’ communications and their actions toward authority was
their  frequent  use  of  a  discourse  which  operated  within  a  traditional  paternalistic
conception of power. An essential part of this concept was – especially on the peasants’
part – a strong personalized relation to authority which went through all instances of
power, from the tsar and down to the landlord and, to some extent, even affecting the
communication with representatives of the public bureaucracy. Some evidence for such a
relationship can be found when one focuses on the addressees of the petitions and the
language  used  by  the  petitioners.  It  can  be  said  that,  as  a  rule,  they  addressed  not
institutions but persons. On the one hand, this can be understood literally, in the sense
that the peasants preferred to address a certain authority that they were subordinated to
directly, even when that meant omitting regular instances of justice. Within this context,
it can be seen that the peasants attempted to get justice with the help of their masters
before they applied to other official institutions. Thus, in 1775, peasants of Count Ivan
Grigorievich Orlov in the Smolensk guberniia twice tried to get an audience with the
count in Moscow in order to personally submit to him a complaint about one of  his
bailiffs. This bailiff, Il’ia Dolganov, had tried to punish them when they refused to deliver
wine from the distillery to the city on their  own horses.  However,  the men did not
tolerate being flogged, as one of them later told in his interrogation: “They didn’t let
themselves be taken, but came to the agreement to go to Moscow in search of Count Orlov
and plea for protection.”25 On their first attempt, they were captured by Dolganov before
they could even reach Moscow. On the second attempt,  they succeeded in getting to
Orlov’s residence only to discover that the count was not at home – and it was only then
that the peasants decided to send a petition directly to the Tsar’s court.
15 In another case, in the autumn of 1777, the peasants of Pëtr Kirillovich Khomiakov (the
owner of a textile factory in the uezd of Pereiaslavl’-Riazansk) planned to send a formal
complaint to the provincial administration in Pereiaslavl’ on account of several factory
workers being killed in a conflict by a military troop. However, at the commune assembly
some of the peasants argued “[…] that, how could they submit [the petition] without the
master’s  knowledge.”26 Accordingly,  they  decided  to  at  least  submit  the  plea  to
Khomiakov’s  father-in-law  –  who  was  staying  in  the  city27 –  and  to  appeal  to  the
provincial administration only after he gave them his permission
16 Another example is given by a letter of the peasants of Nikita Akinfievich Demidov to
their owner in which they tell him that they had already tried many times – in vain – to
get justice and protection from the cruelty of his bailiffs. Meanwhile, they referred to an
earlier  attempt  to  write  a  petition  to  him  in  which  the  bailiffs  and  overseers  had
prohibited and dissolved the commune assembly. Only then had the peasants decided to
go the official way and “prosit’, gde nadlezhalo”28 (in this case, it was the administration of
the Siberian guberniia).
17 The statement that the peasants preferred to address themselves to persons rather than
institutions in their search for justice can also be understood in another way. Even when
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they submitted petitions according to the law at an official administrative institution, the
peasants were often trying to address a person who represented that institution. Thus,
the concept of “personal justice” can even be found in a petition to the general governor
of the Kazan’ and the Penza guberniias, Count Platon Petrovich Meshcherskii who, in his
function as governor, was also the president of the highest local judicial authority. In
their petition, the peasants brought forward a claim against their owner, colonel Zubov,
as having been bonded by him illegally. What is most informative here is the way in
which they applied to the governor as their one and only protector:
By the reason of these utmost galling and entirely ruinous circumstances, without
protection from anyone besides Your Excellency, we turn to your patronage and
justice, and beg most humbly, by your possible guidance, to reach out the hand of
help to the oppressed, and to deliver us from the yoke of the taxes which burden
[us] immoderately.29
18 Thus, while seeking justice, the petitioners addressed the exponent of the administration
not as a  bureaucratic  institution but  rather as  a  (powerful)  person,  appealing to the
governor’s personal sense of justice and his duty to protect his subordinates and ensure
their  well-being  according  to  the  traditional  paternalistic  conception  of  power.30 Of
course, it was rhetoric in the first instance, which was used by the peasants to achieve a
certain  aim.  However,  this  makes  their  statement  no less  informative  to  us.  This  is
because,  on the one hand, they shed light on the ideal of a just authority which the
peasants hoped would find acceptance by their petition’s recipient.31 On the other hand,
this rhetoric was also an expression of peasant pragmatism which can also be found in
their numerous attempts to omit official institutions and submit a petition directly to the
monarch,  whom they hoped would give them attention most  quickly.  The seemingly
prevailing distrust toward official institutions and the bureaucracy is, in the end, based
upon nothing else other than the peasants’ previous experiences. There is, in the first
place, the experience formed when the search for justice at a local administration had no
success. The petitions to the higher instances (such as the Senate or the investigation
commissions,  in the majority of  cases)  contained complaints  about not  having found
justice before the other, local administrations. In the petitions, there often appears an
insistent plea that one’s case should not be passed back to the local instance which had
already lost the petitioners’ confidence. This was the case with, for example, the peasants
from the Petropavlovsk iron and copper works in the Kazan’ guberniia, in 1761 in their
petition to the Senate, asked for their complaint to be investigated by
[…] whom Her Imperial Majesty orders by decree, but only excluding the Kazan, the
Solikamsk and the Cherdynsk voevoda administrations, because we have no hope of
getting protection for our rights from those administrations.32
19 Moreover, part of the peasant pragmatism in their relation with the authorities was that
they knew how to skillfully use those norms of communication which they thought would
be appropriate given the circumstances and which would guarantee them success. Thus,
the petitions to the Viazemskii commission are mostly written in a rather objective style,
their set form and content being in accordance with the formal guidelines. In addition,
they contain scrupulous registers about, for example, what kind of work the peasants
were forced to do without having received the proper payment, how much the factory
owner still owed them, for which kind of performance or products the peasants have not
received any quittances from the factory office, and who have been mistreated by the
factory stewards, in which way exactly and – what was even more important – who were
the eye witnesses for these offences. Those petitioners who did not keep with the formal
“Iz poslushaniia Ego Velichestva ne vykhodim, a ostat’sia nesoglasny”
Cahiers du monde russe, 53/1 | 2012
7
guidelines could be rejected33 –  this meant that communications with the authorities
could only take place under certain well-defined conditions which were clearly known to
the peasants and followed by them.
20 However, it was the peasant pragmatism which, under other circumstances, demanded
that they use other norms of communication which would be more appropriate within a
direct – and perceived as more personal – power relation. One of these norms was, for
example and according to the paternalistic conception of power, the idea of reciprocity,
whereby claims were enforced and admitted less according to the positive law but rather
negotiated on a personal “give-and-take” basis.34 The rules of communication within such
a power relation demanded from the peasants,  on the one side, the attestation of an
absolute obedience and loyalty. On the other side, there was the expectation of protection
and help from the authorities. As such, the peasants of Nikita A. Demidov affirmed in
their letter to him that, although many peasants had fled already, they would not follow
their example and would instead stay at his factories because:
What holds us back, is the love and ancient benefits of Your Highness’s parents, and
that we were raised untroubled at the factories of Your Highness.35
21 They speak of their confidence in Demidov’s role as their protector:
[…] what strengthens us with hope of our well-being and, all the more, of being
provided with our just satisfaction, is Your Highness’s most generous benefactions.
36
22 Moreover, it is because of his protection and paternal care that they would grant him, in
turn, their obedience,
seeing  his  affection,  like  a  father  to  his  children,  gracious  clemency  and  well
becoming regulations  to  protect  the offended,  many have resumed work at  the
factory and wish to work.37
23 Such an idea of reciprocal obligations – whereby obedience is not granted unconditionally
– would find particularly clear expression when the peasants would try to legitimize their
disobedience  and  the  violence  they  had  applied  toward  representatives  of  the
government. One notably illustrative example is provided by the petitions of peasants
from the Romodanovskaia volost’ who, in the spring of 1752, had become disobedient to
their owner, Nikita Nikitych Demidov, and refused to work in his iron factories. In their
petitions to the authorities and in several statements to the brigadier Khomiakov – who
had been sent by the government to settle their uprising – they declared that they had
become disobedient to Demidov only after he began to blatantly violate his patriarchal
duties toward them:
[…] before that we have been obedient to master Demidov in everything and all the
years through, and fulfilled all his work, but only now it has become unendurable
for us because of him, Demidov, and because of his great torture and his unlawful
ruination.38
24 Such a normative expectation toward authority can even be found – in an indirect way –
in some petitions to the monarch, namely when petitioners tried to assure him of their
conscientiously fulfilling their duties as loyal subjects of the monarch:
And all of this, the headtax and the provision dues, the recruits and any other of
Your  Imperial  Majesty’s  public  dues  we  have  paid  every  year  entirely,  without
delay.39
25 Of course, this is, first of all, to be understood as a simple excuse in order to propitiate the
authorities  and  convince  them of  one’s  loyalty  so  that  the  petition  would  be  more
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convincing. However, such an argument can also be understood as an implicit demand –
or  at  least  as  an anticipation –  and as  an interactive  attempt  to  get  one’s  rights  in
exchange for the goods and services performed for the state.40
26 What fits well into a power relation seen as a personal one – and what is a necessary part
of communication within such a relation – is the mostly emotionalizing depiction of the
bemoaned events and of the relation to the petition’s addressee. On the one hand, it is an
essential  part  of  the  idea  of  justice  itself  that  justice  is  imminently  associated  with
emotions. Adam Smith once noticed that “our first perceptions of right and wrong cannot
be the object of reason, but of immediate sense and feeling”.41 In the peasants’ view of
justice, intuition and emotions play a major role so that their reaction to a perceived
injustice is always emotional and affective. Injustice provokes indignation and outrage or
else it makes those who believe themselves to have been treated unjustly call upon the
emotions, conscience and empathy of the other. It is, furthermore, the concept of moral
and ethical  behavior which is closely connected to the emotional  and which actually
constitutes the concept of justice and helps to define it – for example, against the terms of
“legality” or “legitimation”.42
27 Such an emotionalized form of  communication on the part  of  Russian peasants with
authority  should  actually  be  seen  as  part  of  the  peasants’  pragmatism  within  their
specific relationship to power and not at all as a proof of their irrationality or their mere
misconceiving  of  what  was  actually  appropriate  in  official  communication.  This  is
because, in the end, what they aimed to do was to gain the benevolence of a person in
power and awaken his or her sympathy. Moreover, and according to this, within a power
relation conceived of as a personal one, communication with a powerful person would be
more likely to succeed when one cleverly appealed to such a person’s affective side.
28 The emotionalizing elements  in the peasants’  communications with authority  can be
demonstrated particularly well in those parts of their petitions where they describe the
suffering  and  perceived  acts  of  unjust  violence  inflicted  against  them.  Just  like  the
paternalistic conception of a just authority,  on the one hand, they formed a positive
image  of  a  protective  authority;  on  the  other  hand,  it  had  caused  a  similarly
emotionalized negative perception of violence as coming from authority. Complaints of
mistreatment – which exceeded the necessary extent of punishment – have a central
place in the petitions. However, for the peasants, violence and corporal punishment in
the 18th century was a natural part of every hierarchical relation, whether it was in the
family, the commune, the relationship to the lord or else as a prevalent penalty imposed
by the official courts. They well understood the official “language of the lash,” which did
not merely punish offenses but which also represented the social order and its power,
which the peasants would never challenge in general.43 Nonetheless, they also knew well
the norms of this language and, thus, the limits of a form of violence which was merely
arbitrary and undeserved. What is insightful in this are the frequently very detailed and
vivid descriptions of the violence perceived as being unfair and the accurately listing of
the form and severity of the inflicted injuries. An especially dramatic example is provided
by the petition of the peasants of Nikita N. Demidov to the Empress Elizabeth, where they
lament about Demidov:
[…]  many  peasants  he  beat  and  tortured  and,  forgetting  God  and  the  highest
decrees of Your Imperial Majesty, effected the utmost cruel and agonizing tortures,
lifting them on the striaski, whilst fastening big and extremely heavy logs to their
legs and putting their feet and hands into straps. He also caused the women to go
through unendurable tortures,  and burdened them with such a hard work,  that
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more  than  fifty  women  were  forced  to  spawn  the  infants  out  of  their  wombs
unwillingly because of his unbearable tortures and their bitter work. […] regardless
of anything, from time to time he even magnifies his mercilessness and torture,
forgetting the fear of God: at his factories, he beats us mercilessly with the knout
for any small matter or inability during work, because of our utmost suffering and
weakness, he strews salt on the wounds, lays us with our backs on red hot irons,
and places us between the blast furnaces, in a prison which was made there dug
into the earth by him […] and by putting a chain weighing more than 8 pudy onto
the hands and feet and the neck, he thus agonizes us in that hell undeservingly,
from which there are still many wounds on the backs of many.44
29 The description of violence here is based on certain conceptions of justice which can be
attributed to two main sources.  Firstly,  Demidov’s  actions were considered as  unjust
because they transgressed the official law – this was generally the main argument when it
came  to  legitimizing  complaints  toward  the  authorities.  Secondly,  Demidov’s
punishments  were  obviously  condemned  on  the  ground  that  they  violated  religious
ethics.  Seen  within  the  context  of  general  concepts  of  morality  and  humanity,  this
argument  seems to  be  even more important  given the poignancy of  the  account.  In
connection with the appeal to Christian conscience stands another central conception of
peasants’ perception of just authority – the concept of humanity. Accordingly, complaints
about violence were mainly connected to the attribute “bezchelovechnye”. In their petition
to Count Platon Petrovich Meshcherskii,  the general  governor of  the Kazan’  and the
Penza guberniias, the peasants complain about their owner, colonel Zubov:
[…] what is most bitter and dolorous of all, is when any peasant comes to the end of
his tether and doesn’t have anything to pay such an amount of money to Zubov,
even if it was because of an illness, instead of gaining the mercy, which should be
bestowed on human kind,  the  peasant  suffers  the  utmost  ruin,  so  that  his  [i.e.
Zubov’s] profit would not fall in arrears.45
30 Here, they are arguing using a conception of a universal human nature which is common
to  all  people.  This  implies  the  ideas  of  equality  and  charity,  obliging  empathy  and
prohibiting actions which are selfish, arbitrary and which accept the suffering of other
people.46 The importance that was attached to personal morality in the conception of the
just  treatment  of  subjects  also  becomes  clear  in  another  matter.  In  their  petitions,
peasants often lamented a cynical attitude displayed towards them – that is, an attitude
which demonstrated insensibility to their suffering or that the authority was fully aware
of  causing this  suffering.  Such cynical  statements were often quoted in detail  in the
petitions. For example, the peasants of Nikita N. Demidov described following punitive
methods executed in his factories:
And when any of us peasants, according to the order of the bailiffs and overseers,
chops and shortens a log even a vershok too short by mistake, then they would be
tied up, as a felon or some true villain, and be led across the whole lumbering place
and to the cabins. And in front of every cabin, they would whip them mercilessly
with whips and with knouts, saying this: “As you struck the logs, so you shall be
stricken now.”47
31 Another similar punishment practice was used when peasants working as woodcutters
had left tree stumps too high while cutting the wood. The bailiffs would tie them to one of
these stumps and flog them while saying: “[…] we beat you because your stump isn’t flat,
and  as  soon  as  you  flatten  it  with  your  stomach,  then  we’ll  stop  whipping  you.”48
Furthermore, peasants complained not only about an open insensibility towards human
suffering but also – and especially – about a disregard towards the death of subjects. In a
petition to the Grand Prince Paul  Petrovich,  peasants  described the reaction of  Ivan
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Baryshnikov, the owner of a wine distillery, after he had heard that two of his workers
had died in an accident at work: “[…] that I got them for not a high price, each soul for
fifteen kopecks, and even if they get wasted altogether, I wouldn’t be sorry about that.”49
This  cynicism towards  subordinates  –  which they astutely  perceived –  points  to  the
significance  of  the  human  dignity  of  even  the  lowest  peasant.  When  petitioners
complained about cynical treatment, it points to their belief that the authorities to whom
they petitioned for justice had to acknowledge this sense of dignity. Thus, a just authority
or a just governance had to protect its subjects not only from physical violence but also
from personal insult.
32 The emotionalizing of such communications with authority and the applied criteria of
morality  were in no way a  mere “soft”  rhetoric.  Rather,  these elements  possessed a
“significant degree of power”50 which originated in the traditional conception of power
and its  ideas of  reciprocity and personal  responsibility toward subjects,  and through
which petitioners tried to influence the actions of the authorities.51
 
The rationality of peasants’ practices of justice:
justice and law
33 Another essential and (quasi-) “rational” part within the Russian peasants’ idea of justice
was the law. This may appear to be contradictory, given the generally assumed Russian
“peasants’ lack of respect for law”52 (at least until the end of the 19th century). However,
and first of all, the very fact that peasants submitted petitions with compliance to the
formalities means that they knew well the proper legal processes and the laws and made
use of them. Thus, petitions can be understood as an efficient instrument of power, even
more so because the petitioners never openly questioned the orders of the government or
its  legitimacy.  This  acceptance  of  the  official  institutions  of  justice  appears  in  those
petitions where peasants applied to a higher instance, such as the Senate or the monarch
himself. As such, they often attached a long list of the instances they already had gone
through with their complaints without any success, as in most cases the peasants never
submitted their first petition outright to the highest instance. However, this common
practice of running through many instances in the search for justice at the same time
refers to something else – namely, it also points to the fact that knowing and using the
official  instances  did  not  at  all  mean accepting  them or  their  particular  decisions.53
Furthermore, it is also peculiar that peasants were obviously surprisingly well-informed
about the existing laws. In their appeals to the local authorities, the petitioners could
often  reinforce  their  arguments  with  concrete  laws  which  they  referred  to  or  even
quoted.54 With this, their petitions possessed the quality not merely of pleas but rather
gained the character of legal requirements.
34 However, and at the same time, the peasants’ perception and handling of the law also
seems  to  display  a  rather  irrational  character  which  fits  well  with  the  traditional
conception of power and which – in the literature – is termed as a “naïve monarchism.”55
Law was acknowledged as always being legitimate and fair only because (and insofar as) it
was the will of the monarch.56 This explains the petitioners’ frequent attempts at self-
justification,  with their  assurance as  having never breached the law by their  acts  of
disobedience  or  as  ever  having  even  had  the  intention  of  being  disobedient  to  the
monarch or his laws. This went along with the specific portrayal of punishment as unjust
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when it  was perceived as  undeserved or  unjustified.  The peasants  especially  resisted
being criminalized and denigrated as rebels (buntovshchiki).57 Rebellion against the state
was officially treated as high treason and, thus, it was the worst crime that could be
committed and so received the most appalling punishments. In light of the strong belief
in  the  good  “father”  tsar  and  the  specific,  sacralizing  perception  of  his  laws,  an
accusation of  rebellion was  considered as  a  moral  delict  and,  thus,  a  grave  insult  if
declared unjustly. Punishments were perceived as being especially dishonorable when the
peasants were treated as criminals,  “iako tatiu ili  kakomu sushchemu zlodeiu,”58 or even
worse,  as  an enemy,  “iako  k  nepriiateliam.”59 Peasants,  for  example,  often complained
about the obviously widespread practice of shaving workers’ heads and beards, which
would hinder a disallowed abscondence from factories – a procedure which was only
otherwise used on prisoners or soldiers.60
35 Because of the crucial role of the law within their ideas, the peasants accepted only those
actions and measures of the local authorities which they perceived as being consistent
with  the  monarch’s  law.  Hence,  insurgent  peasants  bound  their  obedience  to
administrative orders in order to the claim that they should be able see with their own
eyes a decree signed by the monarch. For instance, in a petition to the Empress Elizabeth,
the disobedient peasants of Nikita N. Demidov made assurances that they would accept
Demidov as their rightful owner and continue their work in his factories immediately, but
only if a decree from the empress, telling them to do so, would be shown to them:
And when the all-merciful Sovereign grants him, the named Demidov, an imiannyi
ukaz, signed by her own hand, and the mentioned, sovereignly granted patrimony,
[…]  then  we  will  not  be  resistant.  But  if  he,  Demidov,  should  raise  any  troops
without Her Imperial Majesty’s own signature, then by the will of God, we will not
give ourselves up into the hands of his troop.61
36 A similar argument is also used when, in the winter of 1796, disobedient peasants in the
Orel guberniia claimed to be state peasants and refused to work in the wine factories of
their mistress, the Countess Nataliia Petrovna Golitsyna. In a petition to the governor
Aleksandr Petrovich Kvashnin-Samarin, they declared:
If Your Excellency has the order, signed by His Imperial Majesty [i.e. Paul I.], to put
us, miserables, further under the yoke of the landlord, then may it be so. We will
not disobey and have never disobeyed the will of His Imperial Majesty, but without
His Imperial Majesty’s own order, we do not agree to stay under the present law.
And whatever pleases Your Excellency, that you can do to us, we are willing to fall
under the arms of the army of His Imperial Majesty.62
37 Conversely, disobedience was justified by claiming that the particular decrees which the
peasants  were violating were fake –  “vydumannye  i  nespravedlivye.”63 A corresponding
argument for self-justification was the peasants’ accusations that their owner or other
authorities were violating the law on their part.64 As such, the claim that a particular act
or command had been done “bez ukazu Eia Imperatorskago Velichestva,” or even “protivu
ukazu Eia Imperatorskago Velichestva,” formed one of the crucial arguments in peasants’
petitions. What was perceived as unjust was always represented as unlawful as well.65 This
implies that the peasants were actually using the same “political language”66 as the state
and the authorities, only that they used it from a different ideological perspective. For
the peasants, it was the unjust authorities who were the true villains (“zlodei”) and whom
they, on their own part, criminalized.
38 What contributes to the idea of the peasants’ dealings with the law as being seemingly
inconsistent and irrational is the fact that their “legalism”67 often involved a somewhat
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idiosyncratic interpretation of the law.68 During the reign of Peter III and during the first
few years of Catherine II, for example, widespread rumors were disseminated about a law
to come about which, the peasants believed, would free them all from serfdom and from
the especially hated bondage of factory assignment.69 Otherwise,  peasants interpreted
valid  decrees  to  their  own  benefit.  In  this  way,  the  peasants  from  the  factories  of
councilor  Aleksei  Fëdorovich  Turchaninov  attempt  to  justify  in  a  petition  to  the
Viazemskii  investigation  commission  their  refusal  to  work  by  having  simply
misunderstood the law:
Which decree,  because  of  our  narrow mind,  we interpreted,  that  by  act  of  this
decree, we shall pay the head tax in money and no longer earn it in factory work.
But as soon as we received the manifesto of the most merciful Imperial Majesty to
go to the factory works, at that same time we began our work and are willing to
perform such work each year for the head tax.70
39 Another example is the peasants’ idiosyncratic understanding of the term “public weal.”
Thus,  in  1797,  the  peasant  Emel’ian Chernodyrov,  head of  the  insurgent  peasants  of
general lieutnant Ivan Aleksandrovich Apraksin in the Orlov guberniia, justifies during
his interrogation their former disobedience as follows:
They thought themselves to be state peasants only because in the vow had been
printed “for the interest of the empire,” and they did not understand the right
sense of these words, and that is why in their pleas, which they sent to His Imperial
Majesty, they asked to free them from the wine distilleries and to make them state
peasants.71
40 The concept of “public weal” was also used to put stress to personal requests.  Often,
peasants based their complaint not only on their own suffering but also claimed that the
injustice inflicted upon them would sooner or later lead to loss for the state in general.
Rhetorically, they often even placed their own interests behind the interests of the state
and the monarch. In a petition to the Senate from December 1761, the peasants from the
Avziano-Petrovsk factory of Evdokim Nikitych Demidov argued:
And even if  our,  the  voiceless’,  mentioned ruin  should  be  disregarded as  of  no
importance,  then  at  least  shall  we  get  mercy  for  the  public  interest,  which  is
stipulated and levied from us, so that we would not be in endless debt, while paying
this interest, because of our guiltless ruin and inability to pay.72
41 They viewed their own impoverishment as harmful to the interests of the state because,
driven to ruin, they would not be able to pay their duties to the state.73 In analyzing
Siberian  collective  petitions  against  voevodas  in  the  17th  century,  Aleksandrov  and
Pokrovskii describe the process of “politicization.” Because arbitrariness towards subjects
and their ruthless exploitation ultimately lead to a loss of state revenues, the abuse of
power  by  local  authorities  was  equated  with  high  treason  by  the  petitioners.74 By
presenting the injustice of local authorities in such a context, the peasant petitioners
found a weighty argument to justify their own disobedience.
42 A  transgression  of  the  official  law can  also  be  found  in  the  widespread  practice  to
submitting petitions directly to the tsar. Because the judicial and executive spheres were
not separated in Russia until the 19th century,75 the tsar was the highest institution of
justice, formally as well as – and even more so – in the perception of the people. The
traditional  topos of  a good and just  tsar contained,  as one of  its  main elements,  the
monarch’s function as a protector of his subjects from the “powerful people” and the
“evil  boiars.”76 That  this,  the  traditional  perception  continued  to  prevail  among  the
peasants in the second half of the 18th century, as proven by the practice of submitting
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petitions to the tsar even after Peter the Great had forbidden the practice since 1699.77
Obviously, this did not make much of an impression, as can be seen by several following
repeated decrees by both Peter and his successors,78 as well  as by countless petitions
which can be found in the records of  the Senate and the Secret Chancellery.79 Many
petitioners continued the still widespread practice of omitting the official laws more or
less consciously by going to the monarch’s court where, while presenting themselves as
“poor  and  getting  help  from nowhere,  except  Your  Imperial  Majesty,”80 they  would
search for protection and justice directly from the monarch him- or herself.
43 Remarkable  in  this  context  is  the  very specific  perception of  the law in its  written,
immediately comprehensible form. Rumors about certain decrees were spreading widely
and quickly, and for the peasants it was often not enough to have only heard about them
– as such, they tried to get a copy for themselves. Moreover, once peasants had a copy of a
decree which they thought would approve their rights in a revolt, they were especially
careful to protect it from the local authorities, to the extent that they would never let it
leave their hands, even to look at. This is illustrated in a case where, in March 1752, the
public clerk Aleksei Evreinov had been sent by the Manufacturer’s College to the textile
factory of Afanasii Abramovich Goncharov in order to bring the rebellious peasants back
to obedience. In his report to the College, Evreinov wrote that the peasants didn’t listen
to him but declared themselves to be “liudi vol’nye,” which is why they would never obey
Goncharov. To prove this, they showed him a piece of paper which they claimed to be a
copy of a decree confirming their words:
Thereby, taking out some unknown piece of paper, they declared to me: here we
have a copy of the decree, which was transcribed in the Borovskaia administration
office, according to which it was ordered not to demand any head tax from us. And
despite my request they did not give me that paper,  and despite my insistently
pressing them to obey and to act in accordance with the decree I showed to them,
they didn’t sign it.81
44 In another case, Michail Loskutnikov – an assigned peasant from the Verkh-Isetskii iron-
factory of Count Roman Illarionovich Vorontsov – stated during his interrogation by the
Viazemskii-commission that, in June 1762 in Ekaterinburg, he had acquired a copy of a
decree  which  allowed  peasants  to  submit  petitions  to  a  special  commission.  After
Loskutnikov returned to his village, the commune decided to make a plea in order to be
released from its work in Vorontsov’s factories. The fact that members of the commune
were bearing weapons during their gathering to elect petitioners, Loskutnikov justified as
follows:
Thereby, some of the peasants had clubs with them as a cautionary measure, so that
the mentioned bailiffs and overseers could not take away the decrees and other
letters sent from the factory office; and not for assaulting the troop, if one would
have been sent to send them out to work, nor for picking up a fight.82
45 These examples point to the peasants’ belief that the law – especially in its written form –
had the power to protect them from unjust treatment by any authorities. On the one
hand,  this  proves  a  pragmatic  assumption  that  fraud  and  arbitrariness  among  the
authorities could be constrained by concrete, manifest evidence. On the other hand, and
for the majority of the peasants, the decrees were inaccessible – even if they possessed
them in the form of a copy – because only very few of the peasants could read them. The
content of the decrees remained mysterious and their relevance came rather from their
symbolic,  ideological  character.  Thus,  written law had a nearly sacral,  magical  status
within a widely illiterate peasant society.83
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46 The foregoing observations invalidate the assessment of the Russian peasants as being
passive and “naïve” toward the authority. Even when the monarch and his or her law was
perceived by the peasants as always being just and sacrosanct, it was exactly this absolute
conception which could become the basis of disobedience and protest and which was used
to legitimize insubordinate actions. This was especially the case when the real laws or
else the actions of the authorities did not coincide with the peasants’ own conceptions of
justice. The conception of the law as always being just could produce a normative attitude
towards governance and,  thus,  it  involved the potential  for subversion and dissent.84
Although the Russian peasants of the 18th century would never make open demands to
the monarch or the central government, they nevertheless had a very clear expectancy of
how they should act.85 They were using practices for establishing justice and for dealing
with authority which were defined by pragmatism and reveal an inner, very specific logic.
This logic was also inherent in cases where a seemingly irrational violence and negation
of authority defined the peasants’ actions. Thus, the Pugachëv uprising of 1773-1775 –
and its success among the rural population – becomes understandable when one gives up
the image of the Russian peasants as being “naïve” and passive toward authorities and
instead considers their specific practices of justice. Such a disposition for violence and
resistance to the authorities was not simply irrational or merely affective, as becomes
clear from the arguments which have been brought forward by the peasants themselves
in order to justify their actions toward the government and, moreover, which reveal their
own established and well-defined set of ideas. The Russian peasants of the 18th century
were not “backward” and unknowing at all when it came to using the right language in
communications with the authorities. The fact that this communication was based on a
rather specific, traditional idea of justice is a continuity which can be traced forward even
into the 20th century.
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ABSTRACTS
This article presents a case study of the perceptions and ideas of justice and just authority in
eighteenth-century Russia. The analysis focuses on factory peasants’ uprisings in the second half
of the eighteenth century.  Drawing on peasant petitions and other documents,  it  shows how
peasants perceived unjust authority and describes the practices they used to (re)establish justice
and the nature of their communications with the authorities. In their conceptions and practices
of justice, peasants combined irrational utopianism and “naive monarchism” with highly evolved
pragmatism in  handling  the  law and  communicating  with  the authorities.  This  leads  to  the
conclusion that, concerning justice, Russian peasants were not at all passive toward authority
and possessed their own well-defined set of ideas and practices.
À travers plusieurs exemples, cet article étudie les perceptions et les conceptions de la justice et
d’une autorité « juste » dans la Russie du XVIIIe siècle. L’analyse porte sur des révoltes de paysans
travaillant dans des manufactures dans la seconde moitié du XVIIIe siècle. Sur la base de pétitions
des paysans et d’autres documents, l’étude fait ressortir la façon dont les paysans percevaient
une autorité comme injuste, montre quelles étaient leurs pratiques pour (r)établir la justice, et
caractérise  leurs  relations avec les  autorités.  Dans leurs  conceptions et  leurs  pratiques de la
justice, les paysans mêlaient à un utopisme irrationnel et au « monarchisme naïf » une façon très
pragmatique  de  manier  le  droit  et  de  communiquer  avec  les  autorités.  Il  en  ressort  que  les
paysans  russes  en quête  de  justice  ne faisaient  pas  du tout preuve de passivité  à  l’égard de
l’autorité et qu’ils avaient leurs propres idées et leurs propres façons de faire, bien définies, pour
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